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ABSTRACT:
In 1999, the Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly enacted the First Amendment to the 1945 Constitution.
Over each of the next three years, it passed a further amendment. This paper argues that the amendments lacked
what have widely been accepted as key features of a democratic constitution-making process. Many of the prob-
lems related to fundamental issues within the Constitution itself. It contained two aspects seen as crucial to the
identity and survival of the country by most nationalists: the rejection of an Islamic state and the imposition in its
place of a nationalist state ideology, the Pancasila. This paper proposes that to resolve the difficult relationship
between Islam and the state - for the immediate future at least - the preamble and Article 29 should be made as a
non-amendable and ‘entrenched’. From Indonesia’s experience, beside observing the general characteristics of
constitution-making process in transition, scholars should note how the symbolic value of the 1945 Constitution
strongly overshadowed the way the constitutional reform took place.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Indonesia declared its independence on 17 August 1945. The
following day, a 1945 Constitution was adopted as Indonesia’s first
Constitution. Over the next sixty two years Indonesia adopted four
different constitutions: the 1945 Constitution, the 1949 Federal Con-
stitution, the 1950 Provisional Constitution and the 2002 Constitu-
tion. I name the current Constitution as the 2002 Constitution be-
cause it is actually a new Constitution and not only amendments to
the 1945 Constitution, as it is formally argued. The last one is
Indonesia’s current Constitution after four amendments to the 1945
Constitution which took effect in 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002. The
four amendments are constitutional reforms made after the down-
fall of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998. The amendments
are very significant because the People Consultative Assembly ef-
fectively rewrote the Constitution. However, none of the political
factions in the Assembly admit that they have made a new Constitu-
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tion. Therefore, formally, the Constitution after the four amendments is still named the
‘1945 Constitution’.
This passage elaborates on the reform of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution. It de-
scribes how the four amendments is Indonesia’s way to reform the constitution from an
authoritarian text into a more democratic one. The 1999 – 2002 constitutional reform is not
an easy one, off course. One of the reason is because the development of Indonesian
Constitution in the last 65 years, from 1945 – 2010, has been strongly influenced by
debates on the relationship between the state and Islam. The last constitutional amend-
ments of 1999 – 2002 are highly coloured by the same debates. The debates relate to
fundamental issues within the Constitution itself. It contained two aspects seen as crucial
to the identity and survival of the country by most nationalists, including the military: the
rejection of an Islamic state and the imposition in its place of a nationalist state ideology,
the Pancasila, contained in the preamble to the Constitution.
Therefore, Chapter XI, Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution, on Religion, was the only
chapter which was not altered by the 1999-2002 constitutional reforms. The rejection of
the proposal to insert the ‘seven words’ of the Jakarta Charter into Article 29(1) was more
evidence that the debates on nationalism and Islamic state are sensitive and crucial issues
in Indonesian constitutional history. The 1999-2002 constitutional debates on the insertion
of the Jakarta Charter, in fact, repeated the same debates which had taken place in 1945
and 1956-1959.
The possibility that both the preamble (Pancasila) and Article 29 should be entrenched
in their current forms to try to resolve the difficult relationship between Islam and state
should therefore be given careful consideration. This would mean that the preamble and
Article 29 should explicitly be identified as non-amendable provisions. This kind of provi-
sion is legitimate from a constitutional law perspective.
Finally, despite the chaotic amendment process, Indonesia has effectively produced a
new Constitution. Evolutionary step-by-step amendment has at last ended the temporary
character of Indonesia’s previous constitutions. Further, the amendments established a
clearer separation of powers between the executive, legislature and judiciary; and far
more impressive human rights protections. The paper will further discuss how Indonesia
finally succeeds in searching its more democratic constitution.
II. EXPLANATION
A. CONSTITUTION MAKING AND AMENDMENTS
This section describes the constitution-making process and amendments in the period
1999-2002. As mentioned above, the People Consultative Assembly adopted four amend-
ments to the 1945 Constitution. Before these amendments the 1945 Constitution had been
in force in two different periods, first from 1945 to 1949, and again from 1959 to 1998.
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Since 1999, the 1945 Constitution has been amended four times. I refer to the amended
document as the “2002 Constitution”, although formally it is still called the “1945 Constitu-
tion”.
Officially, the People Consultative Assembly started the amendment process in 1999
and ended it in 2002. However, the embryo of the amendments was developed in the earlier
period between Soeharto’s forced resignation in May 1998 and the passing of the First
Amendment in 1999 (Bonime-Blanc,;Boulder and London, 1987: 139), that is, during Habibie’s
presidency. During this period, Habibie’s administration set up popular initiatives such as
better protection for human rights, release of political prisoners and reform of electoral laws.
These initiatives created an environment conducive to the introduction of amendments to
insert greater protection of rights into the Constitution. Habibie’s initiative in bringing forward
the election from 2002 to 1999 was another important pre-amendment decision. The 1999
General Election was crucial as part of the preliminary requirement to build a legitimate
People Consultative Assembly that could then amend the 1945 Constitution.
1. How the Constitution-Making was Conducted
Indonesia had no clear direction as to what the amendments should seek to achieve.
The only direction which guided the People Consultative Assembly was the obvious need
to change the Constitution. The five principles that the Assembly members all agreed on
were:
a. to preserve the preamble of the Constitution;
b. to maintain the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia;
c. to keep the presidential system government;
d. to insert the normative provisions then in the elucidation, into the body text of the
Constitution; and
e. to process the amendments through the form of ‘addenda’, without deleting the
original text of the 1945 Constitution.
These five agreements meant, however, that making a totally new Constitution was
impossible. Yet, in reality, the agreement to merely amend the Constitution was not con-
sistent. Table 1 shows the structure of the Constitution before and after the four amend-
ments. It demonstrates that most provisions of the 1945 Constitution were either amended
or deleted. Therefore, the amendments were effectively a total revision of the 2002 Consti-
tution (see Tabel 1).
Table 1 demonstrates that 95% of the chapters, 89% of the Articles and 85% of the
paragraphs are either new or were alterations of the originals. Chapter XI on Religion is
the only one which has not been changed. This again shows that the relationship be-
tween Islam and the state was one of the most sensitive issues dealt with during the
amendment process.
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TABLE 1 THE 1945 CONSTITUTION: BEFORE AND AFTER THE AMENDMENTS
After Amendment  
Before 
Amendment Unchanged 
 
Deleted 
 
Amended 
 
Added 
 
Total 
 
% 
Unchanged 
Chapters 16 
 
1 
 
1 
 
14 
 
5 
 
20 
 
1/20= 5% 
Articles 
 
37 
 
8 
 
1 
 
28 
 
37 
 
73 
 
8/73= 11% 
Paragraphs 
 
65 
 
29 
 
2 
 
34 
 
131 
 
194 
 
29/194= 
15% 
 
This paper argues therefore that the four amendments were a step-by-step process to
write a new Constitution, but without reopening the question of the national symbolism of
the original 1945 Constitution: the rejection of Islamic state and the nationalist state ideol-
ogy, the Pancasila. The principles, which are deliberately highly abstract, are Belief in One
God, a Just and Civilized Humanity, the Unity of Indonesia, Democracy Guided by Inner
Wisdom in Unanimity Arising out of Deliberation among Representatives and Social Jus-
tice for All the People of Indonesia. It was an evolutionary constitutional renewal. In fact,
although it has been changed and modified significantly, the official name of the re-
newed document remains the ‘1945 Constitution’.
Asshidiqie criticized the amendment process for the absence of an academic draft to
guide the process. For him, the paradigm was only found much later, when the People
Consultative Assembly became involved in the serious amendment discussions. Lubis
agrees that the process was conducted without a clear paradigm “without any clear con-
cept, being ad hoc and partial in nature” (Kompas, 2 July 2002). Jakob Tobing, the
Chairperson of the Drafting Committee of the People Consultative Assembly, admitted
that the agenda setting for the amendment appeared to have been:
… by coincidence. Each member of the Drafting Committee of the People Consultative Assembly had
different goals. But after three years of intense negotiation and working together … we had finally achieved
the common goals that we had been fighting for together (Report, Singapore.. <http://
www.vanzorgereport.com/report/ popup/index.cfm).
2. Who the Constitution-Making Body was to be
The question of ‘who the constitution-making body should be’ overshadowed the
four amendment processes. The role of the People Consultative Assembly was constantly
challenged by the possibility of establishing a Constitutional Commission. In the end, the
Assembly could not resist the pressure from the public to establish a Commission. The
Commission established in 2003 after the four amendments were completed was, how-
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ever, given only limited authority to ‘review’ the four amendments and submit its findings
to the People Consultative Assembly.
Although the People Consultative Assembly finally issued a Decree to establish a
Constitutional Commission at the end of the 2002 Assembly’s Annual Session, this Com-
mission was far from what was expected. The mandate of the Constitutional Commission
was also very weak. It was subordinate not only to the People Consultative Assembly but
also to the Working Body of the People Consultative Assembly (Report, Singapore, <http:/
/www.vanzorgereport.com/report/ popup/index.cfm?).
This means that the Commission would merely be a powerless assistant to the People
Consultative Assembly. In this form, the Commission would have no power to design the
structure of any new amendment (The Jakarta Post, 15 July 2003). With such an inferior
position, it was not difficult for the People Consultative Assembly to reject the Commission’s
report, which thus became a useless document. Up to the writing of this paper, the People
Consultative Assembly has never seriously considered the report submitted by the Consti-
tutional Commission.
In spite of the strong criticism of the People Consultative Assembly, no one can deny
its achievement in ratifying the four amendments. Few predicted that the Assembly, a
body with “a justified reputation for party political in-fighting and horse trading” (Tim
Lindsey, 2002: 244). Would ever succeed in achieving a majority decision to approve the
amendment drafts. One of the reasons behind the success was its willingness to reduce its
own power. For Ellis, the People Consultative Assembly has made an exceptional interna-
tional precedent by agreeing to abandon its previously all-powerful status (Ellis, 2003: no
page). The original Article 1(2) of the 1945 Constitution stated that the Assembly was the
sole representative of the sovereignty of the people. This monopoly on sovereignty had
become the legal basis for the People Consultative Assembly to be a supreme parliament.
Extraordinarily, this power was relinquished by the Assembly by the Third Amendment of
Article 1(2), which now stipulates that, “Sovereignty is in the hands of the people and is
exercised in accordance with Constitution”.
3. Public Participation: Limited and Badly Organized
Public participation in the four amendments can be divided into two categories: the
participation arranged by the People Consultative Assembly and that of the civil society
(media and non-governmental organizations). The Assembly failed to conduct compre-
hensive public participation and the participation it allowed was often partial and ad hoc.
Fortunately, however, the civil society covered this shortcoming through active advocacy.
In the First Amendment, public participation arranged by the People Consultative
Assembly was almost non-existent. The time limitation placed on the First Amendment
discussions meant that participation could not be organized properly. During the Second
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Amendment discussions, the People Consultative Assembly was allowed a longer time for
amending the Constitution and some of the time was used to involve the public in the
amendment process and seminars and hearings were conducted. The members of the
People Consultative Assembly’s Drafting Committee of 2000 visited 21 countries as part of
a program called “international comparative studies”. These studies, however, were more
of a ‘picnic’ as there was no obligation for the members to make a comprehensive report
after they had completed the visit (Minutes of the 12th meeting of the Drafting Committee
of the People Consultative Assembly, 11 February 2000).
During the Third Amendment discussions, the People Consultative Assembly, re-
sponding to criticism from the civil society, formed an ‘Expert Team’ to help the amend-
ment process. Most of this team’s recommendations were not adopted by the People
Consultative Assembly. Lastly, during the Fourth Amendment discussions, public partici-
pation programs worked better than in the case of the previous amendments. It was only
during this last amendment debate that the public had a better opportunity to comment
on the amendment proposals (Minutes of the 3rd meeting of the Working Body, 4 June
2002: 175). However, the way the Assembly arranged the participation program did not
leave the public sufficient time to discuss the amendment drafts. The People Consultative
Assembly’s seminars were mostly held in big hotels in metropolitan cities and people in
rural areas, where most Indonesians live had no opportunity to join the seminars.
4. An Unavoidably Messy Process
This section argues that one of the main reasons for the messy amendment process
was because of fundamental perceptions of certain key aspects of the 1945 Constitution
itself. Although this Constitution was widely and passionately criticized as undemocratic
text, it was, and still is, seen by nationalist factions – including the military – as an
important document, which contains two crucial aspects for the survival of the country.
These are the rejection of an Islamic state and the imposition in its place of a nationalist
state ideology, the Pancasila, contained in the preamble to the Constitution. Agreement to
keep the preamble was, therefore, at the heart of all of the constitutional amendments. As
the leader of the nationalist camp, President Megawati was particularly keen to retain the
preamble in its present form (“Constitutional Change: The Charter Again”, Error! Hyperlink
reference not valid.). She argued strongly that:
[t]he position to keep the preamble is non-negotiable. This preamble does not merely consist of
words; it mirrors the national spirit, soul and feelings of the founders and the freedom fighters (Kompas, 13
July 2002).
The preamble was thus more than just a symbolic text: it was a fundamental prin-
ciple. Without the agreement to keep it, amendment would have been difficult if not
perhaps impossible. Members of the People Consultative Assembly, especially from the
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nationalist faction, rejected the possibility of changing the preamble, saying it embraced
what they believed to be the sacrosanct principles of the country: the Pancasila state
ideology and the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia (The Jakarta Post, 6 August
2002). For them, the preamble should never be changed as it acknowledges the presence
and urges the peaceful existence of diverse ethnic groups, cultures and religions in this
country (The Jakarta Post, 31 December 2001).
The debate on maintaining the preamble again revealed two fundamental but differ-
ent ideological groups in Indonesian politics: the nationalists and Islamic groups (Consti-
tutional Change: The Charter Again: 41). The conflict between the two political streams,
especially on the issue of the state and Islam, had been evident in the constitution-making
process in 1945 and in the Konstituante of 1956-1959. Therefore, in the 1999-2002 amend-
ment process, the nationalist faction was again afraid that the Islamic parties would use
the momentum of constitutional reform to establish a preliminary constitutional basis for
an Islamic state. This fear influenced almost all of the decision-making during the four
amendment processes, including the decision to amend and not make a new Constitu-
tion, although in reality this amendment decision was inconsistent.
After the four amendments, the basic conditions are in place to make the constitu-
tional system work. The Jakarta Post has stated that whatever shortcomings one finds in
the four amendments, “they still stand a better chance than the original text in sparing
Indonesia from being plunged back into darkness once again” (The Jakarta Post, 1 Au-
gust 2002). In commenting on the process and the outcome, Lindsey argues that:
… despite all the difficulties, progress is being made: the 1945 Constitution after the Fourth Amend-
ment has many shortcomings but it is an incomparably better document … historically few countries have
ever managed to adopt constitutional reforms as effective as Indonesia’s purely through parliamentary debate
(Lindsey, 2002 : 260).
B. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 1999 – 2002
This section considers parliament, the legislation process, and system of government
pursuant to the four amendments. The 2002 Constitution is clearly a more democratic text
than it was before the amendments. This section also compares the relevant constitutional
provisions before and after the amendments and criticizes some shortcomings of the
outcomes to show that further reform is still needed.
1. Legislative Reform
The four amendments have changed the structure of the parliament. The People
Consultative Assembly, which had previously consisted of the DPR (House of Representa-
tives) and additional functional groups – including the military –, has changed to include
the members of the DPR and the DPD (the Regional Representative Council) (Article 2(1)
                                               
                                                   
J U RN A L
MEDIA HUKUM122
of the Fourth Amendment). The members of the DPR represent political parties’ interests,
while the members of the DPD represent regional interests (Article 22C (1) juncto 22E (3)
and (4) of the 1945 Constitution). Importantly, all members of the two chambers are now
elected by the people. This has meant the end of the system of “free” seats for the military
and other functional groups.
A monumental change occurred when the Third Amendment stipulated that the ‘sov-
ereignty is in the hands of the people and is exercised in accordance with the
Constitution’(Article 2(1) of the Third Amendment). This had the effect that the People
Consultative Assembly is no longer the sole holder of sovereignty, is no longer the highest
institution in the Republic and no longer holds unlimited powers. The sovereignty amend-
ment was followed by other functional reform of the People Consultative Assembly. Table
2 shows the Assembly’s power before and after the amendments. It demonstrates that the
People Consultative Assembly now has more limited powers than it did before the amend-
ments. This highlights the fact that the People Consultative Assembly, as the constitution-
making body, has been able to reform and limit its own powers.
TABLE 2 THE PEOPLE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY: BEFORE AND AFTER THE AMENDMENTS
PROVISIONS BEFORE THE AMENDMENTS AFTER THE AMENDMENTS 
People’s Sovereignty 
 
Monopolized by the People Consultative 
Assembly. 
 
The People Consultative Assembly does 
not monopolize the sovereignty. 
Sovereignty shall be implemented in 
accordance with the Constitution. 
Position 
 
The highest state institution, with unlimited 
powers. 
 
The People Consultative Assembly is one 
of several institutions with limited 
powers. 
Presidential Election 
 
Elected by the People Consultative Assembly. 
 
The People Consultative Assembly 
inaugurates the President and Vice 
President, who are directly elected by 
the people. 
The Broad Guidelines of 
State Policy (GBHN) 
 
Prepared by the People Consultative Assembly, 
the President should implement and account for 
implementation to the People Consultative 
Assembly. 
The People Consultative Assembly does 
not have this authority. 
 
Constitutional 
amendment 
 
Amended and determined by the People 
Consultative 
Assembly. 
The People Consultative Assembly still 
has these authorities. (although the 
amendment procedures have been 
changed). 
Presidential 
Impeachment 
 
Removed by the People Consultative Assembly. 
The procedure was not explicitly stipulated in the 
Constitution. 
 
The People Consultative Assembly has 
the power to remove the President. This 
power is explicitly stipulated in detail in 
the Constitution. 
Vacant Presidency 
 
The Constitution was silent on this. 
 
The People Consultative Assembly has 
the power to elect the President and/or 
Vice President, in the case that one or 
both of the positions become vacant. 
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Since the amendments, the DPR has become a very powerful legislative body. Isra
argues that the amendments have, in fact, resulted in a ‘supreme’ DPR, and the Constitu-
tion has thus shifted from being an executive-heavy Constitution to a DPR-heavy Consti-
tution (Isra, 2004: 128). Asshiddiqie points out the DPR’s involvement in the acceptance of
foreign ambassadors (Article 13 (3) of the First Amendment) as an example of how much
more powerful the DPR has become since the amendments. He argues that this Article is
not practical and breaches the international customs of diplomacy (Asshiddiqie , 2001:
22). Table 3 shows how the DPR has shifted from a ‘rubber stamp’ to a ‘supreme’ organ of
state.
TABLE 3 THE DPR: BEFORE AND AFTER THE AMENDMENTS
NO. 
 
BEFORE 
 
AFTER 
 
1. 
 
The Constitution did not clearly stipulate that the DPR had 
legislative, budgetary and supervisory functions. 
Clearly stipulated. 
2. 
 
The Constitution did not stipulate that the DPR had the right of 
interpellation, the right to carry out inquiries and the right to 
express its opinion. 
Stipulated.  
 
3. 
 
The Constitution did not stipulate that each of the members of the 
DPR had the right to submit questions, to convey suggestions and 
opinions, and a right of immunity. 
 
Stipulated. 
 
4. 
 
The Constitution stipulated that the DPR’s agreement was required 
to declare war, make peace and conclude treaties; and to promulgate 
a government regulation in lieu of law to become a statute. 
Has similar powers.  
 
5. 
 
The Constitution did not stipulate that the DPR’s agreement was 
required: to make an international agreement; to approve and 
confirm the candidate judges of the Supreme Court; to appoint and 
remove the members of the Judicial Commission. 
 
Stipulated.  
 
6. 
 
The Constitution did not stipulate that the DPR selected the 
members of the state Audit Board, and three judges of the 
Constitutional Court. 
 
Stipulated.  
 
7. 
 
The Constitution did not stipulate that the DPR selected the 
members of the state Audit Board, and three judges of the 
Constitutional Court. 
 
Stipulated. 
 
8. 
 
The Constitution stipulated that the DPR received the report from 
the state Audit Board. 
 
Has similar powers.  
 
9. 
 
The Constitution did not clearly stipulate the DPR’s role in an 
impeachment process. 
 
Clearly stipulated.  
 
10. 
 
The elucidation of the Constitution stipulated that the President 
could not dissolve the DPR . 
 
Clearly stipulated in the body of 
the Constitution.  
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Another monumental achievement of the amendment process occurred when the
First Amendment withdrew the power to make statutes from the President, and gave the
power to the DPR. Manan argues that this amendment established clearer checks and
balances between the President, as the executive body, and the DPR as the legislative
body (Manan, 2003: 20-22). It also addressed the previous unsatisfactory situation, whereby
the President had the stronger authority to make statutes. This concept had resulted in
wide-spread abuse of powers under Soeharto’s authoritarian regime (Manan, 2003: 21).
Nevertheless, the legislative role of the DPR remains vulnerable. All the Bills must be
approved by both the President and the DPR through discussion to become law (Article
20 (2) (3) of the First Amendment), and the President retains an absolute veto power to
reject any Bills at this discussion stage (Falaakh, Paper presented at National Seminar on
Meluruskan Jalan Reformasi, http://ugm.ac.id/seminar/reformasi/i-fajrullfallakh.php ), al-
though as explained later, once the President agrees he or she cannot later veto by
refusing to sign a Bill. Within 30 days it will become law regardless of such a refusal
(Article 20(5)).
A further legislative reform was the establishment of a regional ‘senate’ (DPD). This
new institution was intended to give regional communities a more active role in gover-
nance, in line with the concept of regional autonomy (Manan, 2002: 53). The DPD,
however, was given very limited authority, especially when compared to the DPR. This is
yet another example of compromise in the amendment process.
As a result, the DPD now lacks strong legislative powers (Kompas, 2 September
2002). It can only submit Bills to the DPR and then participate in the discussion of Bills
relating to regional autonomy, central-region relations, the formation, expansion and merger
of regions, the management of natural resources and other economic resources, and the
financial balance between central and the regions (Article 22D (2) of the Third Amend-
ment). The DPD can also advise the DPR on Bills relating to the state budget, taxation,
education and religion (Article 22D (2) of the Third Amendment). However, it is not
involved in the ratification process of any of these Bills. This is a matter solely for the DPR
and the President (Article 20 of the First Amendment). Further, the DPD has the authority
to supervise the implementation of laws on these matters, but does not have the authority
to take further action. This action is a matter for the DPR, to which the DPD submits the
results of its supervision (Article 22D of the Third Amendment). Consequently, Manan
argues that the DPD is only a complementary, rather than supplementary, chamber to the
DPR (Manan, 2002: 56).
2. Executive Reform
Ellis argues that, before the amendments, Indonesia’s so-called presidential system
was not ‘presidential’ in the sense the term is understood in the United States and the
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Philippines, because Indonesian presidents were not directly elected and could be dis-
charged by People Consultative Assembly vote (Ellis, 2002: 119-120). Since the amend-
ments, however, Indonesia has adopted this more ‘conventional presidential system’ model
(Ellis, 2002: 152). Table 4 shows the Indonesian presidential system before and after the
amendments.
TABLE 4 THE PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM: BEFORE AND AFTER THE AMENDMENTS
PROVISIONS 
 
BEFORE 
 
AFTER 
 
One Person or Collegiate 
 
One Person. 
 
One person. 
 
Status 
 
Chief of Executive. 
 
The same. 
 
Election Process 
 
Indirect, by the People Consultative Assembly. 
 
Directly elected by the people. 
 
Unlimited, could be re-elected every 5 years. 
 
Limited for a maximum two terms of 5 
years. 
 
Tenure 
 
Not fixed, easily removed. 
 
Fixed, not easily removed. 
 
Legislative Powers 
 
More dominant than the DPR. 
 
Shares powers with the DPR and DPD. 
 
Appointment and re-
moval Powers of high 
ranking state officials. 
Not clearly stipulated. In practice, these powers are, 
therefore, unlimited. 
Limited. 
Impeachment Procedure: 
 
Legal Basis 
 
Generally mentioned in the elucidation of the 
Constitution, and was mostly stipulated in a People 
Consultative Assembly Decree. 
Stipulated in the Constitution. 
Reasons 
 
More political than legal: if the President ‘truly 
breached’ state policy and the Constitution. 
 
More criminal. That is if the President is 
convicted of ‘treason, corruption, other 
high crimes or misdemeanors, or proven to 
no longer fulfill the requirements of the 
office of President’. 
 
Judicial Branch 
 
Not involved in the process. 
 
Involved. The Constitutional Court shall 
investigate, try and decide on a 
recommendation by the DPR that the 
President should be impeached. 
Requirement 
 
Easier. A simple majority vote, which rejects the 
accountability speech, could impeach a President. 
 
More difficult. The process requires the 
decision-making in the DPR, Constitutional 
Court and People Consultative Assembly. 
Only an absolute majority vote in the DPR, 
a guilty decision in the Court and another 
absolute majority vote in the People 
Consultative Assembly can impeach a 
President. 
 
 
Table 4 demonstrates that Indonesia now enjoys a better system of checks and bal-
ances on presidential powers. Although the direct presidential election strengthens the
legitimacy of the President, this does not mean that the power of President will be unlim-
ited. The President’s removal and the appointment power of high-ranking state officials is
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better regulated. For example, under the original 1945 Constitution, there were no provi-
sions on how members of the People Consultative Assembly, DPR, BPK (the State Audit
Agency) and Supreme Court Judges were to be elected or appointed. Consequently,
President Soeharto managed to choose loyalists as members of these institutions. These
“President’s men” contributed to a general absence of institutional controls over the Presi-
dent for most of the New Order period. The amendments directly addressed these prob-
lems. Now, for example:
a. members of the People Consultative Assembly, DPR and DPD shall be elected by the
people (Article 2(1) of the Fourth Amendment).
b. the members of BPK shall be chosen by the DPR, taking into consideration the
advice of the DPD, and approved by the President 9 Article 23F (1) of the Third
Amendment); and
c. the names of candidates for appointment as a Justice of the Supreme Court shall be
submitted by the Judicial Commission to the DPR and then be confirmed by the
President (Article 24A (3) of the Third Amendment).
The legislative power, which was previously dominated mainly by the President, has
now shifted to become a power of the DPR (Article 5(1) and 20 (1) (5) of the First
Amendment), with little participation by the DPD (as mentioned). The President, how-
ever, still has a significant legislative power. Bills are discussed and must be assented to by
both the DPR and President at this stage (Article 20(2) (3) of the First Amendment). This
Presidential consent requirement is basically the ‘veto right’ for the President. This right is
stronger than the veto right of the President of the United States. In Indonesia, if the
President rejects a Bill there is no mechanism by which the DPR and/or the DPD can
overrule such a rejection. However, if the President does give assent at this stage he or she
may not later change his or her mind and refuse to sign the Bill into law. Article 20(5)
provides that a Bill agreed upon by both the President and DPR will become law in 30
days, in such circumstances. To strengthen the system of checks and balances, however,
the President’s legislative powers should therefore be further reformed by being reduced
or limited by giving the DPR and DPD an American-style right to counter veto a discussion
stage refusal by the President.
3. Human Rights Reform
The original 1945 Constitution lacked sufficient human rights provisions (Susanti,
2001: 3). This was one of the biggest shortcomings addressed through the amendments.
Kawamura, for example, argues that:
[i]f Indonesia intends to become a democratic state, establishment of constitutional guarantee of human
rights and freedom as inalienable rights of human beings certainly is one of the top priority tasks (Kawamura,
2000: 2).
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Indeed, after the Second Amendment of the 2002 Constitution, the human rights
protections were more impressive, on paper at least. Clarke argues that the amendment
on the Bill of Rights is “the first meaningful protection of human rights in Indonesia’s 1945
Constitution” (Clarke, 2003: 3). Lindsey argues that the long and impressive Chapter XA
on Human Rights succeeds in shifting the original 1945 Constitution from a document
which guaranteed few human rights, to one which, in a formal sense at least, provides
more extensive human rights protection than do many developed states (Lindsey, 2002:
36, 254).
There are, however, at least two shortcomings in the human rights provisions. The first
is relatively minor, in relation to duplication of provisions: for example, both Articles 27(1)
and 28D (1) stipulate equality before the law. The second, however, is a major shortcoming.
It relates to Article 28I (1) (the non-retrospectivity provision), discussed earlier. The problem
is not the non-retrospectivity provision itself. Despite being widely debated, the notion of a
law not being applied retrospectively has been adopted in many countries and is a norm of
international law, although with qualifications (Clarke, 2003: 8-14).
The problem for Indonesia is that the Second Amendment stipulates that the non-
retrospectivity provision “may not be interfered with under any circumstances at all” (Ar-
ticle 28I (1) of the Second Amendment). This is against international norms, which are
usually read by Courts as gratifying retrospectivity prohibitions. Clarke, for example, ar-
gues that, “[the] most established exception to the principle of non-retrospectivity is crimes
against humanity” (Clarke, 2003: 11). This exception cannot apply in Indonesia as the
Constitution now stands and this has serious implications for human rights prosecutions in
relation to abuses committed, for example, under the New Order by the military.
4. Judicial Reform
This section elaborates judicial reform pursuant to the four amendments. In the 2002
Constitution, there are two main judicial reforms: first, in addition to Article 1(3) of the
Third Amendment, which expressly stipulates that Indonesia is a state based on Law
(Article 1(3) of the Third Amendment), the Third Amendment further strengthens judicial
reform by explicitly inserting the ‘independence of the judiciary’ principle into the Consti-
tution (Article 24(1) of the Third Amendment). This principle had previously only been
stipulated in the elucidation of the Constitution and not in the text.
Secondly, compared to the executive and legislative bodies, the structural reforms to
the judiciary are more comprehensive. The Third Amendment established two new insti-
tutions: the Constitutional Court and Judicial Commission. The Court has an equal posi-
tion to the Supreme Court, but with a different jurisdiction. The decision to form a new
court is a better solution than giving the new judicial powers to the Supreme Court, given
the acute corruption problems in the Supreme and existing lower level courts. As Lindsey
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points out, concern about the integrity of existing courts was, in fact, one of the key
reasons for the establishment of the new Court (Lindsey, 2002: 261). Table 5 shows the
judicial branch before and after the amendments.
TABLE 5 THE JUDICIARY: BEFORE AND AFTER THE AMENDMENTS
 BEFORE 
 
AFTER 
 
Independence 
 
Stipulated in the 
elucidation. 
 
Stipulated in the body of the 
Constitution. 
 
Institutions 
 
The Supreme Court and its 
lower level courts. 
 
The Supreme Court, lower level 
courts, Constitutional Court and 
Judicial Commission. 
Judicial review of a 
statute 
 
N/A 
 
Performed by the Constitutional 
Court. 
 
Dispute settlement 
between state institutions 
 
N/A 
 
Performed by the Constitutional 
Court. 
 
Political parties dissolution 
pro-cedure 
 
N/A 
 
Performed by the Constitutional 
Court. 
 
Dispute settlement of 
general elections results 
 
N/A 
 
Performed by the Constitutional 
Court. 
 
Involvement in the 
impeachment 
 
N/A 
 
Performed by the Constitutional 
Court. 
 
Appointment and removal 
of judges 
 
Unclear - in practice was 
monopolized by the 
President. 
 
For the judges of the Supreme 
Court, this is a matter for the 
Judicial Commission, the DPR 
and President. 
For the Constitutional Court, this  
is a matter for the President, 
DPR and Supreme Court. 
 
One of the crucial powers newly granted is judicial review of statute, something
which was unavailable prior to the Third Amendment. Indeed, within one year of its
establishment in 2003, the Constitutional Court had “won a reputation for competence
and independence” through its exercise of this new power (The Australian. 27 July 2004).
In terms of rule of law, in 2001, the Third Amendment of the 1945 Constitution rules that
“The Indonesian state is a state ruled by law”. Before the amendment, the same provision
is only part of the elucidation of the 1945 Constitution. During the amendment process in
1999 – 2002, important provisions in the elucidation are adopted as body text of the
Constitution, while the rest of the elucidation is no longer acknowledged as part of the
Constitution.
Further, the Indonesian legal system is outlined in Article 24, the Judicial Power
Chapter of the 2002 Constitution which rules that the judicial power is the independent
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power to maintain a system of courts with the objective of upholding law and justice. The
judicial power is exercised by a Supreme Court and the courts below it in the respective
environments of public courts, religious courts, military courts, administrative courts and
by a Constitutional Court.
Article 24C of the 2002 Constitution rules that the Constitutional Court has the author-
ity to hear matters at the lowest and highest levels and to make final decisions in the
review of legislation against the Constitution, the settlement of disputes regarding the
authority of state bodies whose authority is given by the Constitution, the dissolution of
political parties, and the settlement of disputes concerning the results of general elections.
The Constitutional Court has the duty to adjudicate on the opinion of the House of
Representatives regarding allegations of misconduct by the President and/or the Vice
President in accordance with the Constitution.
III. CONCLUSION
The development of the Indonesian Constitution in the last 65 years, from 1945 –
2010, has been strongly influenced by debates on the relationship between the state and
Islam. The last constitutional amendments of 1999 – 2002 are highly coloured by the same
debates. The four constitutional amendments lacked what has widely been accepted as
key features of a democratic constitution-making process. This problem with the reform
process, however, related to fundamental issues within the Constitution itself. It contained
two aspects seen as crucial to the identity and survival of the country by most nationalists,
including the military: the rejection of an Islamic state and the imposition in its place of a
nationalist state ideology, the Pancasila, contained in the preamble to the Constitution.
Many nationalists feared that opening the Constitution to real change would jeopardize
these positions, which they saw, and still see, as non-negotiable.
Chapter XI, Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution, on Religion, was the only chapter
which was not altered by the 1999-2002 constitutional reforms. The rejection of the pro-
posal to insert the ‘seven words’ of the Jakarta Charter into Article 29(1) was more evi-
dence that the debates on nationalism and Islamic state are sensitive and crucial issues in
Indonesian constitutional history. The 1999-2002 constitutional debates on the insertion of
the Jakarta Charter, in fact, repeated the same debates which had taken place in 1945 and
1956-1959.
Notwithstanding the agreement to keep the preamble, the Islamic factions kept fight-
ing for the insertion of the ‘seven words’ of the Jakarta Charter into Article 29 of the
Constitution, that is, for an expanded application of syariah. This was understood by the
nationalist groups as an initial step towards establishing an Islamic state, something that
the nationalist groups (including the military) saw, and still see, as non-negotiable. In the
end, the insertion of the ‘seven words’ of the Jakarta Charter was rejected, just as it was
during the constitutional debates of 1945 and 1956-1959.
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The possibility that both the preamble (Pancasila) and Article 29 should be entrenched
in their current forms to try to resolve the difficult relationship between Islam and state
should therefore be given careful consideration. This would mean that the preamble and
Article 29 should explicitly be identified as non-amendable provisions. This kind of provi-
sion is legitimate from a constitutional law perspective.
The 1999-2002 constitutional reform in Indonesia lacked several key features of a
democratic constitution-making process: the amendment schedule constantly changed;
there was no clear plan or objective; short-term political interests contaminated the amend-
ment proposals; the MPR failed to win the people’s trust in its capacity as a constitution-
making body; and public participation arranged by the MPR was limited and badly orga-
nized. However, after having decades of no debate on the amendment of the Constitu-
tion, flaws in the process were unavoidable. Despite the 1945 Constitution being under-
stood as an authoritarian document, it was still considered to be the source of a guarantee
of two fundamental elements of the Indonesian state: (i) the rejection of an Islamic state;
and (ii) the imposition in its place of a nationalist state ideology, the Pancasila, contained
in the preamble of the Constitution.
Further, despite the often-chaotic amendment process, Indonesia has effectively pro-
duced a new Constitution. Evolutionary step-by-step amendment has at last ended the
temporary character of Indonesia’s previous constitutions. The amended 1945 Constitu-
tion is the first Indonesian Constitution which does not explicitly mention that it is a
provisional Constitution. Additionally, at the end of the process, the four amendments has
created a far more democratic Constitution. In particular, the amendments established a
clearer separation of powers between the executive, legislature and judiciary; and far
more impressive human rights protections.
Finally, from Indonesia’s experience, beside observing the general characteristics of
constitution-making process in transition, scholars should note how the symbolic value of
the 1945 Constitution strongly overshadowed the way the constitutional reform took place.
Despite a process that was different to democratic processes in other countries, Indonesia’s
slow, patchy and tentative process managed to lead the country to a more democratic
Constitution and contribute significantly to Indonesia’s transition from overt authoritarianism.
As The Asia Times wrote after the ratification of the Fourth Amendment in 2002:
[t]he process may have been messy and circuitous, but Indonesia’s adoption of constitutional amend-
ments underline how, in the end, the … country remains very much on the transitional, if bumpy, road to
democracy (The Asia Times, 14 August 2002).
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